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Abstract
This paper develops a general equilibrium model that
incorporates specific features pertaining to developing
countries: a large informal sector and rural–urban migra-
tion. A calibrated version of the model is used to study the
effects of energy tax changes and a reduction in agricul-
tural-sector energy subsidies on labor market outcomes.
The results indicate that the incidence of energy taxes is
partly shifted on to the rural sector through rural–urban
migration. The results thus highlight the importance of
modeling the features particular to developing countries
and the economic general equilibrium effects when assess-
ing the impact of environmental taxation in those countries.
1 | INTRODUCTION
A large number of studies have analyzed the incidence of carbon taxes in developed countries, and
a subset of these studies have looked at how carbon tax policies affect unemployment. Nonethe-
less, general equilibrium studies of environmental taxation, based on unique institutional and eco-
nomic characteristics of developing countries, are limited. Special features of developing
economies, which include “dual” economies with modern and traditional sectors, or three-sector
economies with a traditional rural sector and an urban sector (characterized by both a formal and
informal sector), suggest that models from studies of developed countries are not appropriate to
examine the employment and wage impacts of green tax policies. The policy guidelines derived
from existing studies in developed countries are likely to be misleading for developing countries,
as they do not take into account economic conditions that are specific to developing countries.
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This paper develops a dual economy model, which is an extension of Satchi and Temple
(2009) to analyze the effects of energy taxes in general equilibrium. The model features three sec-
tors: urban formal, urban informal,1 and rural agricultural. The search and matching frictions fol-
lowing Pissarides (2000) form a distinction between formal, or “regulated,” jobs and informal, or
“unregulated,” jobs. This entails that workers in the informal sector search for jobs in the formal
sector, with the unemployment rate being defined as the proportion of the population that is self-
employed in the informal sector. The income of the unemployed comprises unemployment benefits
and income from self-employment in the informal sector.
I solve the model numerically and choose parameter values to match some key aspects of labor
markets in Mexico. I find that modeling key features of developing countries, namely rural–urban
migration, can lead to qualitatively different conclusions about the incidence of higher energy taxa-
tion on poverty in developing countries. As in the simplified version of the main model, even
though agricultural workers do not pay energy or labor taxes, they still bear the burden of environ-
mental taxation through reduced wages. A potential explanation for this wage reduction is as fol-
lows: (a) when unemployment benefits and income from self-employment in the informal sector
are fixed in real terms, the urban sector reduces demand for labor due to higher energy taxes and
the agricultural sector absorbs some of the increased number of unemployed people; or (b) when
unemployment benefits are proportional to the after-tax income of urban workers and labor taxes
are evaded in informal sector, as environmental taxation imposes a heavy tax burden on the unem-
ployed, the unemployed try to escape the brunt of higher taxation by either searching for jobs
more intensively or migrating into the urban area, which pushes wages down in the rural area.
I also find that fixing the energy tax in the agricultural sector while increasing the energy tax
imposed in the urban area results in a higher reduction in the earnings of rural-sector workers than when
energy taxes change universally in the economy. This is because the former policy is associated with a
relatively higher burden on the urban sector than the latter, resulting in a higher outflow of labor into
the rural area, which leads to a higher decline in the earnings of workers in the agricultural sector. Fur-
thermore, simulations of the model with energy subsidies in the agricultural sector also suggest that
higher energy subsidies to protect the incomes of rural workers from the adverse effects of environmen-
tal taxation in the urban area can be counter-productive. Specifically, a higher level of energy subsidy
provision to the rural sector is associated with a larger decline in earnings of rural workers when the
urban sector is subject to environmental regulation. Intuitively, larger subsidies create more budgetary
pressure and less room for the government to reduce payroll taxes, which ultimately determines whether
such a reduction in labor taxes can offset the adverse effects of higher energy taxes on labor productiv-
ity and thus lead to a reduction in unemployment. If unemployment is reduced by less, more people
migrate to the rural area, pushing wages down and increasing the incidence of poverty.
Finally, the results indicate that the energy intensity of the urban sector is important for the size
of the potential double-dividend effects, and consequently for how rural sector wages are affected
by environmental regulation. If the urban sector is highly labor-intensive, declines in energy
demand due to higher energy taxes impose a smaller tax burden and the effects of environmental
regulation are less pronounced. As a result, the prospects for a sizable reduction in unemployment
are much lower in the economy, resulting in a larger inflow of workers into the rural area and
therefore a larger decline in agricultural wages. Conversely, with a lower energy intensity of the
agricultural sector and relatively higher energy intensity of the manufacturing (urban) sector, envi-
ronmental regulation is associated with a higher reduction in payroll taxes and consequently higher
employment, leading to lower migration and a decline in rural sector wages.
This paper makes two main contributions. First, it demonstrates the importance of modeling spe-
cial features of developing countries when analyzing the tax incidence of carbon taxes in developing
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countries. Looking only at the effects of environmental regulation on the sector that is subject to reg-
ulation would underestimate the potential adverse spillover effects on other sectors of the economy
through migration patterns. For instance, the reduction in agricultural-sector wages due to urban-sec-
tor taxation can be sizable and comparable with the effects of regulation on incomes of the unem-
ployed. Simulations of the benchmark model under the assumptions that incomes of the unemployed
are proportional to the after-tax urban wage and that labor taxes are evaded in the informal sector sug-
gest that a doubling of the energy tax rate from its baseline value reduces the income of the unem-
ployed by 4.48 percent and rural-sector incomes by 2.77 percent. Therefore, the effects of
environmental regulation in developing countries have to be analyzed using a different theoretical
framework than conventional models suggest. Even though the focus of this paper is on the effects of
energy taxes, similar issues arise with analyzing other tax incidences in developing countries.
Second, the paper develops a tractable framework that incorporates features that are specific
to developing countries. This framework highlights an important rural–urban migration channel
through which environmental regulation can yield other dividends that are important in assess-
ing the overall welfare effects of regulation in developing countries. For instance, in many
developing countries facing large rural–urban migration, the inability of city authorities to offer
housing and basic public services to these migrants leads to the formation of slums, deteriora-
tion of living conditions, congestion, and environmental risks. In such circumstances, a larger
rural population associated with higher energy taxes could be beneficial and could offset the
costs of environmental taxation in terms of lower rural wages. I do not perform welfare analy-
sis in this paper, but this simple framework can be extended to study the welfare effects of
green tax reforms in developing countries by taking these general equilibrium effects into
account. Another potential extension of the model could be to allow workers to have different
productivity levels, which would facilitate studying the distributional implications of green tax
policies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the structure of the model.
Section 3 explains the parameterization of the model. Section 4 discusses the simulation results. In
Section 5, I test the sensitivity of the baseline results to changes in the values of some parameters,
as well as the functional form of the production function. Section 6 considers three extensions to
the core model: the first allows payroll taxes paid by employees; the second makes an explicit dis-
tinction between the unemployed and the self-employed in the urban sector; and the third endoge-
nizes the job destruction rate. Section 7 concludes.
2 | MODEL
The paper develops a general equilibrium search model in the style of Diamond, Mortensen and
Pissarides (DMP: Diamond, 1971; Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994), with a large informal sector
and potential for rural–urban migration, in a setting with a polluting production factor and environ-
mental taxes.2 The economy comprises two regions/sectors: urban and rural/agricultural, denoted
by m and a, respectively. The urban sector is characterized by search and matching frictions, which
mean that unemployment exists in equilibrium.3 This in turn partitions the urban sector into infor-
mal (unregistered, assumed to be self-employed) and formal (registered) production activities, and
I use the term “unemployed” to refer to self-employment in the informal sector. The size of the
population is normalized to 1 and can be decomposed as follows:
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La þ ð1 uÞLm þ uLm ¼ 1; (1)
where La and Lm are the sizes of agricultural and urban sectors respectively, and u is the fraction
of informal-sector workers in the urban labor force. There is scope for migration between urban
and rural areas, so that workers can allocate themselves between the two sectors. Once workers
migrate from rural areas, they first enter the informal urban sector, from which they search for jobs
in the formal sector.
There are two types of firms: agricultural-sector firms and registered urban-sector firms. Firms
operating in rural areas produce goods for consumption in that region. The rural (agricultural) sec-
tor is assumed to be perfectly competitive and is characterized by full employment. I assume that
the economy imports both energy and capital at given world prices and that both are inputs into
registered production activities. In the informal sector, workers are assumed to be self-employed
and engage in low-productivity labor-intensive tasks. Goods from formal and informal production
activities are assumed to be perfect substitutes.
Consistent with the Harris–Todaro model (Harris and Todaro, (1970), I assume that all workers
are risk neutral. Finally, I assume that revenues collected from taxing energy and labor are used to
provide general government goods and transfers to the unemployed.
The model uses the DMP framework of wage bargaining, instead of the Burdett and Judd
(1983) and Burdett and Mortensen (1998) framework for equilibrium labor market search,
which is based on the wage posting theory of wage determination. I use the DMP approach as
opposed to the Burdett–Mortensen approach as I aim to understand how environmental policies
affect labor market flows and unemployment, and the DMP matching framework is an appro-
priate framework for this analysis. In addition, I exploit the fact that environmental taxes affect
the outside option of the bargainers (which is key in the Nash bargaining process) differently
than other taxes. And finally, some evidence suggests that developing countries have a long
tradition of determining wages and working arrangements through collective bargaining
(Lamarche, 2015), despite considerable heterogeneity in terms of the coverage rates. For
instance, in the 1970 and 1980s, industry-wide collective bargaining was widespread in Latin
American countries such as Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela, but currently bargaining is
shifting towards decentralization, allowing negotiations at the firm level. Collective bargaining
agreements affect less than 15 percent of workers in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Peru and
more than 70 percent in Argentina, Bolivia, and Uruguay.
2.1 | Agricultural sector
Agricultural output is produced using capital (land), labor, and energy,
Ya ¼ AaKc1a Lc2a E1c1c2a ; (2)
and production per worker is given by
gaðka; eaÞ ¼ YaLa ¼ Aak
c1
a e
1c1c2
a : (3)
Agricultural workers are paid a wage wa, and derive positive utility from living in a rural area,
va > 0. The firms import energy at given international energy prices (the small open economy
assumption) and pay taxes according to their energy use. The agricultural sector is assumed to be
perfectly competitive, which implies that
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wa ¼ gðka; eaÞ  raka  pEð1þ sEÞea; (4)
with return on fixed capital given by
ra ¼ g0kaðka; eaÞ; (5)
in which the demand for energy in the agricultural sector is
g0eaðka; eaÞ ¼ pEð1þ sEÞ: (6)
I assume there are no search frictions in the agricultural sector. Even though it may seem
strong, there are several arguments based on features of agricultural unemployment in developing
countries that support this assumption. Firstly, agriculture in developing countries is still very
labor-intensive, so there is high demand for labor in agricultural production compared to other sec-
tors. Commercial agriculture (agricultural production by firms for domestic or foreign markets)
often requires both a long-term stable workforce and temporary labor (seasonal, subcontracted,
and/or migrant). Mass recruitment of workers is much more common than individual job postings
and occurs in designated areas known to the workers (e.g. hiring casual labor from marketplaces
or other local gathering places). These factors make it relatively easy for workers from other sec-
tors to find jobs in the agricultural sector, at little cost (per vacancy) to the firm (Cheong and Jan-
sen, 2013). Also, agricultural jobs in developing countries tend to require fewer specific skills and
qualifications compared to formal sector jobs. Although jobs in commercial agriculture are becom-
ing more specialized due to mechanization, the nature of the tasks involved (e.g. tilling, planting,
and harvesting) means that training happens on the job. Therefore, search frictions due to a mis-
match in skills required for the job and the skills that job-seekers possess are unlikely (Cheong
and Jansen, 2013).
2.2 | The urban labor market
Urban sector goods can be produced either from formal or informal activities. Labor market search
and matching frictions form the distinction between production activities of formal and informal
goods. The production process in the formal sector uses labor, (imported) capital and (imported)
energy, while in the informal sector workers are engaged into low-productivity, labor-intensive
tasks.
2.2.1 | Matching, flow equilibrium and Beveridge curve
In formal labor markets, the number of new matches between job searchers and vacancies is
represented by the constant returns to scale matching function:
m ¼ mðsuLm; vLm;MÞ ¼ MðsuLmÞcðvLmÞ1c; (7)
where uLm denotes the number of unemployed workers, s is the average search intensity, vLm is
the number of open vacancies, and M denotes matching efficiency. The probability of a vacancy
being filled is
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q  m
vLm
¼ M su
v
 c
¼ Mhc; (8)
where
h ¼ v
su
(9)
measures labor market tightness and 1/q the expected duration of the vacancy. Note that q(h) is a
decreasing function of h, and I define ɛhq0(h)h/q > 0. I assume that the match between worker
and firm in the formal sector is destroyed with an exogenous Poisson rate k. Thus the law of
motion for the number of unemployed satisfies
_uLM ¼ Lmðkð1 uÞ  suhqðhÞÞ; (10)
where Lmk(1u) is the number of separations and Lmsuhq(h) is the number of hires. In the steady
state, the inflows and outflows of employment in the informal sector must balance:
kð1 uÞ ¼ suhqðhÞ; (11)
which determines the relationship between the unemployment rate and the rate of vacancies (labor
market tightness), that is, the Beveridge curve.
2.2.2 | Workers’ expected gains
In the informal sector, each worker receives z+br(s;z), where z denotes the labor productivity
(output) of each worker,4b denotes unemployment benefits, and r(s;z) represents formal job
search costs which depend on search intensity s and labor productivity z. I distinguish between
different arrangements concerning the taxation of unemployment benefits and the characteristics
of the informal labor market, and discuss the specification of b and z in Section 2.2.5.
U and W denote the value to the worker of being unemployed (and searching for a formal job)
and being employed in a formal job, respectively. There is an incentive to search for jobs in the
formal segment of the urban sector, as the ex post value of working in formal jobs is the highest.
Informal sector workers decide how actively they search for a formal sector job. As discussed in
Pissarides (2000), different levels of search intensity alter the probability of being matched with a
vacancy. In particular, a worker i, who searches for a job with intensity si, when all other workers
search with the same level of intensity s, has a matching rate proportional to his relative search
intensity si=s:
qi ¼ sisuLm mðsuLm; vLmÞ ¼ siqh ¼ siMh
1c: (12)
Following Satchi and Temple (2009), I determine the optimal level of search intensity for worker i
by equating the worker’s marginal search costs (rsi ) to the expected benefits dqi=dsiðW  UiÞ of
job search, and then by imposing symmetry:
r0sðs; zÞ ¼ hqðW  UÞ; (13)
with sqh the probability of finding a job for every job searcher.
A worker’s expected utility of being unemployed and employed in a formal job can be defined
as
rU ¼ zþ b rþ sqhðW  UÞ; (14)
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rW ¼ wm þ kðU W þ PÞ; (15)
where P is a severance payment paid by the firm to the departing employee.
2.2.3 | Firms and labor demand
I denote by V and J the value to the firm of holding a vacancy and a filled job, respectively. Each
firm pays a flow cost c to post a vacancy. Once it is filled, the firm employs one worker paid the
wage wm, rents capital km from international capital markets, and imports the polluting production
factor energy em at an exogenously given price pE. Firms are liable to energy and payroll taxes.
Jobs are destroyed each period at an exogenous rate k, at which point the worker returns to the
informal sector. The firm makes a severance payment P to the departing employee, which is an
important feature of labor markets in developing countries such as Mexico.
Each firm produces the output Amf(km,em), where Am is a total factor productivity parameter and
f(km,em) is the intensive form of production technology, with capital, km, and energy utilized per
worker, em. Under these assumptions,
rJ ¼ Amf ðkm; emÞ  ð1þ sLÞwm  rmkm  pEð1þ se;mÞem  kðJ þ P VÞ; (16)
rV ¼ cþ qðJ  VÞ: (17)
The first-order conditions for the capital–labor ratio and energy–labor ratio are
Amf 0kðkm; emÞ ¼ rm; Amf 0eðkm; emÞ ¼ pEð1þ se;mÞ; (18)
which imply that
rJ ¼ yðkm; emÞ  ð1þ sLÞwm  kðJ þ P VÞ; (19)
where
yðkm; emÞ  Amf ðkm; emÞ  rmkm  pEð1þ se;mÞem:
Free entry into the creation of vacancies implies V = 0, and states that in equilibrium, the expected
profit from a job has to cover the expected cost of a vacancy:
J ¼ c
q
: (20)
By combining equations (19) and (20) to eliminate J, and by assuming that hiring costs are a fixed
proportion m of the producer wage in the formal sector, c = m(1+sL)wm, we obtain the following
equation:
yðkm; emÞ ¼ ð1þ sLÞwm 1þ ðkþ rÞ mq
 
þ kP; (21)
which states that output per worker net of capital and energy costs equals total labor costs (includ-
ing wage costs), the expected capitalized value of hiring costs, and expected severance payments.
2.2.4 | Wage determination
Search and matching frictions in the formal urban sector imply that each match gives rise to a sur-
plus that is shared between the firm and its worker through a generalized Nash bargaining process.
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Using the parameter b to index the worker’s bargaining power, a wage bargain in the formal sector
determines wages for formal urban jobs according to
wm ¼ arg maxðW  UÞbðJ  VÞ1b; (22)
which yields the first-order condition
ð1 bÞð1þ sLÞðW  UÞ ¼ bJ: (23)
Using (14), (15) and (20) to eliminate WU and J from (23), we obtain the following expres-
sion for the wage rate:
wm  ðzþ b rÞ
wm
þ kP
wm
¼ b
1 b m
r þ k
q
þ sh
 
: (24)
The higher the bargaining power of workers (b), the larger is formal sector income (including
expected severance pay). A higher interest rate (r), a larger separation rate (k), or a tighter labor
market (h) raises the rents from a job match and thus raises the wage.
We can also rewrite the equation that determines the optimal level of search intensity, using (13),
(20) and (23):
r0s ¼
b
1 b hmwm: (25)
2.2.5 | Unemployment benefits and informal sector labor productivity
A large number of different models have been developed to examine the potential for a double
dividend. The existing literature suggests that in models with involuntary unemployment, the tax
burden has to be shifted away from workers to other groups in society (e.g. recipients of income
transfers) for a double dividend in employment to potentially arise.5 Within the context of a search
model, the outside option of the workers (the income of the unemployed) affects the bargaining
position of workers and thus the equilibrium wages. This in turn impacts hiring decisions and
determines the equilibrium unemployment in the economy. Therefore the effect of environmental
taxation on the income of the unemployed can influence the scope for a double dividend (see, for
example, Koskela and Schob, 1999; Bovenberg and van der Ploeg, 1998).
Following Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1998), I consider two different assumptions on the
income of the unemployed: fixed benefits and fixed informal-sector income (b ¼ b and z ¼ z); and
unemployment benefits and informal-sector income represent some fraction of formal sector earnings,
such that b = pbwm and z = pz(1+sL)wm. The latter indexation rule suggests that labor taxes are
evaded in the informal sector, but energy taxes are not. This is a plausible assumption, since pre-exist-
ing taxes such as taxes on labor tend to be easier to evade than certain forms of environmental taxes,
as I discuss below in the context of Mexico. For the discussion of the simulation results, I refer to the
first assumption on the income of the unemployed as ‘fixed UI’ and to the second assumption as ‘pro-
portional UI’. Proportional UI and fixed UI are empirically plausible, as they are broadly supported
by stylized facts on benefit indexation schemes currently present in some Latin American countries,
as discussed in the next section. There are potentially many other indexation schemes (see, for exam-
ple, Koskela and Schob, 1999; Bovenberg and van der Ploeg, 1994), with environmental (or other)
tax reforms exerting different impacts on the income from unemployment. The cases chosen represent
two opposing scenarios: when green tax reform cannot affect the income from unemployment, and
when it can shift the brunt of the tax burden on the unemployed, respectively.
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2.2.6 | Summary of energy tax evasion arguments, with specific applications
to Mexico
I first briefly discuss the structure of energy taxation in Mexico, and then present an outline of
arguments in support of the theoretical assumption that energy taxes are harder to evade than other
taxes, such as value-added tax (VAT) or income taxes.
The Mexican government sets energy product prices for gasoline, diesel, and liquefied petro-
leum gas (LPG), but only taxes gasoline and diesel. Natural gas, coal, LPG, and electricity are not
directly taxed, although electricity may be indirectly taxed if diesel is used for electricity produc-
tion (OECD, 2013). Almost all oil products (aside from some petrochemicals) are produced and
sold by the state-owned oil company, Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex).
The legislation that governs taxes on gasoline and diesel is called the IEPS (Ley del Impuesto
Especial sobre Produccion y Servicios). Under these laws, taxes are levied directly on the gaso-
line and diesel sold by Pemex to retailers. The government does not directly tax the sales of
gasoline/diesel to final consumers. The IEPS tax has two components: one variable and one
fixed.6 The variable component allows the government to maintain retail prices of gasoline and
diesel despite fluctuations in the international price of oil. The government adjusts this compo-
nent according to the difference between domestic prices (set by the government) and Pemex’s
production costs (which mainly depend on international gasoline and diesel prices). If domestic
prices are below production costs, the government provides a subsidy to Pemex by giving a tax
credit on its VAT and ordinary hydrocarbon fee obligations (the variable component is negative).
If domestic prices are above production costs, the government levies a positive tax on Pemex
(the variable component is positive). The IEPS variable component is calculated monthly and dif-
fers according to the kind of fuel (regular or premium in the case of gasoline: automotive, indus-
trial, or marine in the case of diesel). The second component of the IEPS tax is a fixed positive
tax that depends on the type of energy (unleaded gasoline, 0.36 MXN per liter; premium gaso-
line, 0.4392 MXN per liter; diesel, 0.2988 MXN per liter). Tax credits equal to the entire vari-
able component are given to diesel oil used in agriculture or industry (except mining), or for
shipping and fishing purposes.
Energy taxes in Mexico are more difficult to evade than other taxes for the following reasons
(Liu, 2013; OECD, 2013). First, it is easy to measure and monitor energy consumption at the sup-
plier level, either by directly monitoring centralized points of infrastructure (e.g. electricity grid,
pipelines, and storage tanks) or by indirect methods such as air pollution signatures. The Mexican
government would find measuring and monitoring especially easy because almost all oil products
are produced by one company (Pemex), which is also state-owned.
Second, energy prices have well-established prices and more transparent marketplaces, so are
usually easier to assess than prices of other taxable goods. In Mexico, energy taxes depend on
international prices and Pemex’s production costs, both of which can be observed and verified.
Although reported production costs can be manipulated to some extent, such manipulations would
only affect the variable component of the energy tax and Pemex still has to pay the fixed compo-
nent. Hence it is relatively difficult to completely evade energy taxes in Mexico. Third, the chemi-
cal structure of energy sources is fixed, so there is little room to manipulate the composition of
energy sources to evade taxes.
Finally, government data support the intuition that environmental taxes are harder to evade than
other taxes in both developed and developing countries. The Mexican government taxes gasoline and
diesel in accordance with the IEPS. The estimates shown in Table 1 are the tax gap7 as a percentage of
the theoretical tax revenue, according to the type of tax: sales tax (similar to VAT), payroll taxes, taxes
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on rental income, taxes on business income (income earned by individuals from business activity, e.g.
self-employment), corporate tax, and IEPS taxes (excise taxes on specific goods produced and sold
within Mexico). Although gasoline and diesel taxes belong to the IEPS taxes category, gasoline and
diesel were subsidized from 2005 onwards (OECD, 2013), so they are not included in the IEPS tax
gaps reported in this table. However, the much lower tax gap for IEPS taxes suggests that these taxes
are generally much harder to evade than taxes based mostly on taxpayers’ self-reports (e.g. firm
income or income from self-employment).
Table 2 shows similar tax gap statistics for the UK, where environmental taxes are part of the
category ‘other’ (along with inheritance tax, petroleum revenue tax, and insurance premium tax,
all of which make up a relatively small proportion of this category). Compared to the UK, Mex-
ico’s percentage tax gaps are much higher for all similar categories except ‘other’, where the IEPS
tax gap is only slightly larger than the ‘other’ tax gap. Based on these government statistics, it is
likely that the level of energy tax evasion in Mexico is both relatively low and similar to that of
developed countries.
TABLE 1 Tax Evasion Estimates, Mexico (%, by Type of Tax)
Year Sales Payroll Rental income Business income Corporate tax IEPS taxes
2004 34.9 19.6 88.7 70.0 55.0 7.9
2005 31.7 18.2 90.1 71.9 42.8 9.0
2006 25.5 17.0 90.4 71.9 41.2 8.9
2007 27.0 16.1 90.5 58.9 29.7 10.4
2008 24.3 15.9 87.2 68.2 24.1 12.3
2009 26.3 16.6 86.2 73.7 25.6 6.6
2010 27.0 12.6 86.0 84.2 23.7 10.4
2011 29.5 16.4 86.0 84.9 22.1 9.2
2012 24.3 15.5 85.7 83.4 31.4 6.1
Notes: The percentages represent the tax gap as a proportion of the theoretical tax liability (defined as the tax gap plus the actual
amount of tax received). Source: OECD (2015).
TABLE 2 Tax Evasion Estimates, UK (%, by Type of Tax)
Year VAT Excise duties Income Corporate Other
2005 14.7 7.8 5.6 13.7 5.6
2006 12.9 7.9 5.3 11.5 6.4
2007 11.7 7.3 5.8 10.2 6.2
2008 14.7 7.1 4.6 10.8 5.7
2009 12.6 6.6 5.3 11.3 6.6
2010 11.2 6 5.5 9.3 5.6
2011 11.7 4.9 5.1 6.4 5.1
2012 11.9 4.7 4.9 7.1 5.4
2013 11.1 5.2 5 6.7 5.6
Notes: The percentages represent the tax gap as a proportion of the theoretical tax liability (defined as the tax gap plus the actual
amount of tax received). Source: HM Revenue and Customs (2015).
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2.2.7 | Unemployment insurance systems in Latin American countries: A
short overview
By looking at a sample of Latin American countries,8 I broadly group unemployment benefits into
two categories, summarized in Table 6 in the online appendix.
In most countries, unemployment benefits are tied to earnings, with minimum and maximum
thresholds. Argentina, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Brazil are among the countries with top and bottom
boundaries. In Argentina, benefits decrease once they have been granted for 4 months (there is no
declining scheme for shorter-term benefits); a similar declining pattern is also in place in Chile and
Uruguay. In Ecuador, the unemployed receive a one-off lump-sum payment upon losing employment.
Mexico does not have a nationwide UI scheme. However, there is a social security system in
place that allows registered workers to withdraw a maximum of 30 days’ worth of their pension
savings from their individual account in the event of unemployment, once every 5 years.9 More-
over, temporary employment programs are in place for workers from rural areas (with benefits
being set at 99 percent of the local minimum wage) and in order to deal with the weak coverage
(less than 50 percent) of the official social security system, a program named Seguro Popular (SP)
was introduced in 2002 providing workers with health but not employment benefits. To complete
the scattered coverage, Mexico City launched its own unemployment benefit scheme in 2007 (Pro-
grama Seguro de Desempleo del Distrito Federal). Benefits are restricted to 6 months, and the
monthly benefit is worth 30 days of minimum wage. The existing Mexican programs have features
that resemble flat-rate systems.
As such, the stylized facts presented in Table 6 in the online appendix provide evidence that
supports the flat-rate system and earnings-related indexation scheme of benefits used in this model.
2.3 | Rural–urban migration
Like Satchi and Temple (2009), I allow for rural–urban migration and assume that rural migrants ini-
tially enter the urban informal sector. Migration involves a cost /f jf j, where /f represents the conges-
tion effect caused by migration intensity10 and f represents migration flows from the agricultural
sector to the city (a negative sign would imply a migration flow in the opposite direction). The migra-
tion equilibrium condition is that the discounted value of being employed in the agricultural (rural)
sector must be equal to the workers’ expected utility from entering the urban informal sector:
wa þ va þ r/f f ¼ rU: (26)
In the steady state, migration flows cease (f = 0) so, using (14) and (13), the above migration
equation can be rewritten as
wa þ va ¼ zþ bþ r½er  1; (27)
where ɛr = sr
0
(s)/r is the elasticity of search costs with respect to s. Equation (26) implies that in
the steady state, workers are indifferent between staying in agriculture and moving to the informal
urban sector. It implies that an increase in unemployment benefits and income in the informal sec-
tor attracts more labor from the agricultural sector to the informal sector, thus driving up wages in
the agricultural sector. An increase in search intensity naturally entails a rise in search costs but
also increases the probability of finding a job in the formal sector. Thus, when the expected bene-
fits from search (rɛr = sr
0
(s)) exceed the costs (r(s)), workers migrate from the agricultural to
the informal sector, causing an increase in rural wages.
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2.4 | The government’s budget constraint
I assume that the government’s main commitments are the provision of public goods G and trans-
fers to the unemployed:
Gþ uLmb ¼ sLwmð1 uÞLm 1þ m r þ kq
 
þ se;mpEemð1 uÞLm þ sapEeaLa: (28)
Government consumption expenditures are not assumed to have a productive role in this model.
Government revenue includes revenues from taxing energy in the formal sector (se,mpEem(1u)Lm)
and the agricultural sector (sapEeaLa), total payroll taxes paid by employees in the formal sector
(sLwm(1u)Lm), and taxing capitalized recruitment costs (sLwm(1u)Lmm(r+k)/q). When sa < 0,
the government provides energy subsides to the agricultural sector. Throughout this paper, I con-
sider green tax policies under which government spending remains constant.
2.5 | Key features of developing countries and environmental policies
In this section I discuss the key features of labor markets in developing countries that are impor-
tant to model in order to study the implications of environmental policies for labor markets in
developing countries. First, there is a high share of informal employment (self-employment or
household/family business employment), especially in low-income countries, partially due to the
importance of agriculture in their economies (Cho et al., 2012). Second, there are low female par-
ticipation rates, especially in middle- and upper middle-income countries where less than half of
females are in the labor force (45 and 49 percent on average, respectively). In low-income coun-
tries, female participation is higher because minimal household earnings force women to enter the
workforce. Third, most of the labor force does not work for large firms (Ayyagari et al., 2011),
and most new jobs are created by new establishments of existing firms and small new firms (Halti-
wanger et al., 2010). Finally, there is a limited access to social security systems such as UI. Only
35 percent of developing countries have unemployment benefits as part of their social insurance
system, while the rest rely on severance pay, which generally involves long legal or administrative
processes. In upper middle-income countries, on average only 30 percent of the workforce is cov-
ered by UI. In middle-income countries, UI coverage varies across time for individuals, as they
frequently transition between formal and informal employment, and also change employment status
(Levy, 2008). The much lower coverage rate compared to developed countries is partly because
social security laws exclude those in informal employment (e.g. self-employed or household work-
ers) and agricultural workers.
This information supports the three-sector model set up with perfectly competitive firms in
urban areas because informal and agricultural employment are still significant in developing coun-
tries (relative to developed countries), and there is generally a lack of UI (and few beneficiaries/
low coverage even when there are UI systems).
3 | PARAMETERIZATION
I select parameter values that enable the theoretical model to produce reasonable figures for labor
market characteristics such as the size of the informal sector, agricultural employment, and average
employment duration for the case of Mexico.11 I assign values to structural parameters using the
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latest available official data, with reference to similar existing studies that analyze labor market
policies in Mexico or Latin American countries that share many similar labor characteristics with
Mexico. The baseline parameter values are summarized in Table 3, and Table 4 reports the charac-
teristics of the labor market implied by the theoretical model, as well as the corresponding values
from actual Mexican data. The time period is assumed to be 1 month.
3.1 | Matching and labor market parameters
I assume that the matching function is a Cobb–Douglas function (m(sv,u) = M(su)cv1c), and set
the value of c equal to 0.5, which is a commonly accepted value in the literature.12M and s are
chosen to yield a plausible value for the duration of employment (see Table 4), and are set at 0.1
and 0.5, respectively. I set the value of b at 0.5 as it is again accepted by most of the literature.13
The value of parameter m in the cost of posting a vacancy (c = m(1+sL)wm) is set at 0.4; for com-
parison, Satchi and Temple (2009) sets the ratio c/wm equal to 0.4. Following Satchi and Temple
(2009), I assume that the average severance payment P is four times the wage which, along with
the assumption that P = zP(1+sL)wm, yields a value of zp = 3.36.
TABLE 3 Baseline Parameter Values
Parameter Cobb–Douglas pr.f. CES pr.f.
Search model parameters
m parameter of vacancy posting cost 0.40 0.4
s search intensity 0.5 0.5
/ search cost elasticity 2.00 2
b bargaining strength of workers 0.5 0.5
M matching function efficiency 0.1 0.1
zp indexation of severance pay to wage 3.36 3.36
p search intensity parameter 3.14 3.14
c matching function elasticity 0.50 0.50
k monthly job separation rate 0.04 0.04
Other parameters
se energy tax rate 0.15 0.15
r monthly interest rate 0.04/12 0.04/12
rm return on capital 0.04/12 0.04/12
a1 share of capital in formal sector production 0.269 –
c1 share of capital in agricultural sector 0.63 0.63
a2 share of labor in formal sector production 0.5 –
c2 share of labor in agricultural sector 0.22 –
a share of labor in formal sector production – 0.3
c2 share parameter in the nested CES function – 0.1
ɛ elasticity of substitution btw capital/labor & energy – 0.05
Aa productivity in agricultural sector 1 1
Am productivity in urban sector 2 5.2
AE fossil energy-augmenting technology – 5.2
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The annual interest rate and return on capital (r and rm, respectively) are set to 4 percent, which
is the value used in the literature (Satchi and Temple, 2009; Albrecht et al., 2009)). The monthly
job separation rate, k, is set at 0.04. For reference, Gerard and Gonzaga (2012) base their estimate
on monthly data for Brazil and report a monthly separation rate of 0.04, and Satchi and Temple
(2009), using quarterly estimates from Gong and van Soest (2002), calibrate k at 0.06. I decided
to set k at 0.04, which allows me to match the labor data statistics better. This parameterization
yields an unemployment rate of about 31 percent, which is very close to the official estimate of
34.1 percent for Mexico (2009Q2), of the number of people employed in the informal sector as a
share of non-agricultural employment.14
3.2 | Search intensity, labor income, and government
Following Satchi and Temple (2009), I use a simple power function for the cost of search intensity:
rðsÞ ¼ pzs/: (29)
I assume that / = 2 in line with Satchi and Temple (2009), and the value of the parameter p is
chosen to generate plausible values for both productivity in the informal sector and the total
income of the unemployed. The agricultural employment share, La, is set to 0.13, which matches
the data for Mexico in 2010.15 The value of va is then computed from the model’s migration equa-
tion (26).
The payroll tax rate, sL, is set at 0.25. OECD data suggest that the average labor income tax
(tax wedge) faced by Mexican workers in 2013 is 19.0 percent, with an average compulsory pay-
ment wedge of 26.9 percent.16 At the same time, payroll taxes may make up a maximum 35 per-
cent of the payroll in Mexico (see International Business Publications, 2012). The values for the
payroll tax rate used in the literature differ considerably: while Satchi and Temple (2009) use a
value of 0.1, Albrecht et al. (2009) use a value of 0.5. The baseline tax on energy, se,m = sa, is set
at 0.15, which together with other parameters allows me to match the share of public consumption
in GDP quite well. Specifically, I assume that government spending accounts for 10 percent of
GDP (w = 0.1), which is consistent with the empirical evidence for Mexico. In particular, the aver-
age share of general government final consumption expenditure in GDP is 11.4 percent during the
period 1991–2013, while the average share is 10 percent for the period 2004–2008.17 The baseline
value of energy subsidies in agricultural sector is set at 0.15.
TABLE 4 Labor Market Characteristics: Data versus Model
Labor market
characteristics
Model Model Data Source
se,m=0.15 se,m=0.15
sa=0.15 sa=0.15
Agricultural
employment share, La
0.13 0.13 0.13 Mexico 2010, World Bank
(SL.AGR.EMPL.ZS)
Unemployment
(informal sector
share), u
30.94% 30.7% 34.1% Mexico 2009, LABORSTA, ILO
Payroll tax rate, sL 0.25 0.25 0.19, 0.27 Mexico (2013), OECD
Average employment
duration
17.85 mths 18.06 mths 12–27 mths
a
Mexico (1992, 1993) Gong and
van Soest (2002)
aRespectively for men women and men.
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3.3 | Urban sector production function
The baseline specification of the formal urban-sector production function is assumed to be Cobb–
Douglas:
Ym ¼ AmKa1m ðð1 uÞLmÞa2E1a1a2m ; (30)
which in intensive form is given by
Amf ðkm; emÞ ¼ Amka1m e1a1a2m : (31)
Cobb–Douglas technology has been widely used – see Golosov et al. (2014) as well as Barrage
(2012) and references therein – and, as argued by Hassler et al. (2012), seems to be a reasonable
representation of energy input use with a longer time horizon.
As I consider the case of an open capital account18 for developing countries, this version of the
model can be seen as capturing long-run adjustment, making the Cobb–Douglas specification a suit-
able choice. For the baseline Cobb–Douglas technology specification (33), I set the values of the
parameters at a1 ¼ 0:269, a2 ¼ 0:5, and c1 ¼ 0:63 (Satchi and Temple, 2009). These shares yield
a value of the baseline share of energy costs in total production of 23.1 percent, which is broadly con-
sistent with some evidence for developing countries. For instance, the energy intensity of the Chinese
industry has been estimated at 40.7 percent (Yuan et al. (2009)). The estimates of 35 and 17 percent
are the values of energy input per unit of value added in non-metallic mineral products and paper and
in paper products, respectively, across developing countries (Upadhyaya, 2010). However, much
lower values for the expenditure share of energy, such as 1 a1  a2 ¼ 0:03, have also been used in
recent macroeconomic models of climate change (see, for example, Golosov et al., 2014; Barrage,
2012). To accommodate these estimates, I perform a sensitivity analysis on my results.
I also test how sensitive results are to a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production
function specification, which is considered to be a better representation of energy demand in the
short and medium term (e.g. Hassler et al., 2012) than a Cobb–Douglas production function – that
is, formal sector production is instead given by
Yt ¼ ½ð1 c2Þ½AtKat ðð1 uÞLtÞ1a
e1
e þ c2½AEt Et
e1
e  ee1; (32)
where L is labor, At the capital/labor-augmenting technology (later called Am), A
E fossil energy-
augmenting technology, e the elasticity of substitution between capital/labor and fossil energy, and
c2 a share parameter.
For the nested CES production function (32), I set the values of the parameters of the produc-
tion function at a = 0.3, e = 0.05,19 and c2 ¼ 0:1.20 The values of the exogenous price of energy
and augmenting technology are chosen to match the labor data statistics so that the baseline values
for both production function specifications are the same.
Finally, the small open economy and open capital account assumptions imply that the return to
capital is equal to the world interest rate. In addition, given that the price of energy is determined
internationally by the world markets, equations (18) imply that both km and em are exogenously
given.
3.4 | Agricultural production
As for the formal sector, the baseline specification of the agricultural-sector production function is
assumed to be Cobb–Douglas:
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Ya ¼ AaKc1a Lc2a E1c1c2a ; (33)
which in intensive form is given by
gðkaÞ ¼ Aakc1a e1c1c2a := (34)
Energy usage is a considerable part of agricultural production, as it is used for fossil fuel, chemical
fertilizers, pesticides, and machinery, as well as electricity for production processes such as land
preparation, irrigation, intercultural operation, threshing, harvesting, transportation, and packaging.
For the USA, energy and energy-intensive inputs account for a significant share of agricultural pro-
duction costs. For example, corn, sorghum, and rice farmers allocated over 30 percent of total produc-
tion expenditures to energy inputs in 2011. Direct and indirect energy-related expenses represented
an average of more than 13 percent of total farm production expenses in 2005–8 – direct energy use
averaged about 6.7 percent of total production expenses in the sector, while fertilizer expenses repre-
sented another 6.6 percent (Beckman et al., 2013). According to British Institute of Energy Eco-
nomics (BIEE) reports, energy intensity in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay is around 0.15, so I set the
value of energy intensity in the agricultural sector (1 c1  c2) at 0.15. Since I choose the value of
c1 at 0.63 as in Satchi and Temple (2009), the expenditure share of labor stands at 0.22.
As Ka represents a fixed factor in agricultural production I can normalize its value to unity
without loss of generality. In choosing the values of productivity parameters Am and Aa, I draw on
a recent study by Gollin et al. (2014), who undertake a thorough development accounting exercise
using high-quality micro-data from household surveys to find that the rural–urban or agricultural–
manufacturing productivity gap is at least a factor of 2. Accordingly, I normalize the value of Aa
at 1, and set the value of Am at 2.
3.5 | Other parameters
Finally, apart from matching some of the data statistics, this parameterization is consistent with all
of the model’s assumptions. In particular, I have verified that the following conditions of the
model hold: wm+kP > z+br; and P < wm/k. The first condition implies that workers will only
engage in job search if it is worthwhile, that is, the expected return from a formal job is greater
than the return from being in the informal sector and searching for a formal job. The second condi-
tion implies that the (expected) severance payment P accounts for less than half of expected labor
income from employment.
4 | DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS
In my analysis, I utilize two versions of the aforementioned model. I refer to the model outlined in
Section 2 as the ‘core model’, and to its simplified version (in which the agricultural sector does
not use energy as an input into a production process), as the ‘benchmark model’.
4.1 | Unemployment
Figure 1 depicts the effects of green tax reforms, in terms of increasing carbon taxes, on the level
of unemployment (i.e. the size of the informal sector) in the benchmark economy under two differ-
ent unemployment benefit indexation schemes.21 It confirms the findings of previous studies that
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in models with involuntary unemployment, the double dividend (a decline in the unemployment
rate) arises when the unemployed bear the burden of higher energy taxation. The intuition for this
result is clear and discussed in the literature (see, for example, Koskela and Schob, 1999; Boven-
berg and van der Ploeg, 1998). When unemployment benefits are fixed in real terms, the outside
option available to workers remains unaffected by a green tax policy. This effectively raises the
bargaining power of workers, who resist large cuts in after-tax wages, increasing labor costs and
harming formal-sector employment. Conversely, with indexation of unemployment benefits and
informal sector earnings to after-tax urban wages, the unemployed now share the cost of a cleaner
environment, but a shift from labor taxes toward carbon taxes has a heavier impact on the income
of the unemployed from informal activities (z). Since the income from informal activities repre-
sents the bulk of the income from unemployment, this implies a much larger decline in the value
of the outside option of workers. This weakens the bargaining strength of workers, prompting them
to accept lower wages. This boosts labor demand and reduces unemployment.
4.2 | Earnings in the agricultural sector
Figure 2 displays the effects of carbon tax increases on wages of workers in the agricultural sector
in the benchmark economy under two different assumptions about the income of the unemployed.
FIGURE 1 Benchmark Model: Aggregate Unemployment and Income of the Unemployed [Colour figure can
be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
FIGURE 2 Benchmark Model: Agricultural-Sector Earnings [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
KURALBAYEVA | 523
The figure shows that the income of agricultural workers decreases even though they pay nei-
ther energy nor labor taxes. Carbon taxation indirectly affects the income of workers in the
agricultural sector through rural–urban migration. This illustrates that the traditional model used
to analyze tax incidence in a developed country without rural–urban migration – as in Koskela
and Schob (1999) and Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1998) – is not appropriate in this con-
text. Applying such a model to study the impacts of carbon taxes will underestimate the inci-
dence of carbon taxes and wrongly estimate the potential costs of environmental regulation.
The figure therefore shows some of the reasons why a multi-sectoral model with rural–urban
migration is important for studying the effects of carbon taxes within the context of developing
countries.22
Specifically, when unemployment benefits are fixed in real terms, a decrease in formal-sector
employment is partially absorbed by the agricultural sector as the urban sector shrinks. The inflow
of labor into rural areas pushes down wages in the agricultural sector not only in absolute terms,
but also relative to formal-sector wages so that the incidence of poverty, measured by wages, is
higher. If, however, unemployment benefits are proportional to after-tax urban wages, the unem-
ployed now share the tax burden of higher energy taxes. Moreover, labor taxes and energy taxes
have different impacts on income from unemployment. The specification of the income of the
unemployed generated in the informal sector implies that payroll taxes do not affect productivity
in the informal sector, and so the unemployed can escape some of the additional tax burden on
labor. In contrast, the energy tax decreases both unemployment benefits and productivity in the
informal sector, with income generated in the informal sector declining by more than unemploy-
ment benefits: a 100 percent increase in the energy tax rate from a baseline value of 0.15 leads to
a 0.72 percent decrease in unemployment benefits and a decrease in income for those in self-
employment by 5.45 percent, with the decline in total income of the unemployed constituting 4.48
percent.
Therefore, a green tax policy involves replacing payroll taxes with energy taxes that impose a
heavier burden of taxation on the unemployed, through its effect on income from self-employment.
As such, the unemployed try to escape the brunt of taxation by searching for a job in the formal
sector or by migrating into rural areas. In fact, the search intensity of the unemployed s increases.
Since not all workers are able to find a job in the formal sector, some of them migrate into the
rural area. As before, an inflow of labor into the agricultural sector pushes wages down.
4.3 | Energy use in the agricultural sector and the effects of green tax
reforms
Thus far, I have considered the benchmark model of the economy, which does not use energy in
the agricultural sector. As we saw in the previous sections, agricultural-sector workers still cannot
avoid the burden of higher energy taxes through the migration channel. However, the different
energy intensities of rural living versus urban living can further impact the migration channel and
could also represent another channel through which green tax policies affect various sectors of the
economy. Figure 3 shows the effect on earnings in the agricultural sector by model (benchmark
and core), with proportional UI and with the same energy tax levied across both sectors of the
economy, that is, se,m = sa. The decline in the earnings of agricultural-sector workers is larger in
the core model for the following reasons. Real earnings generally fall in response to higher carbon
taxes in each sector, particularly in the agricultural sector. This is because higher emission taxes
reduce the demand for energy, which in turn reduces labor productivity and consequently the
demand for labor. Furthermore, payroll taxes are imposed on urban-sector incomes only, implying
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that the government cannot offset the adverse effects of pollution tax on agricultural workers, so
that the overall tax burden on those workers tends to rise. In addition, the rural–urban migration
effect discussed above exacerbates the adverse effect of a pollution tax, further pushing down
earnings in the rural area.
Above, I considered the situation in which pollution taxes are imposed universally and uni-
formly across the economy. However, there are also circumstances when carbon taxes are levied at
various rates across different sectors. Next, I consider in turn two different assumptions on the pol-
lution tax in the agricultural sector: a fixed energy tax versus a tax rate that varies alongside
urban-sector energy taxes (i.e. se,m = sa). Figure 4 shows how earnings in the agricultural sector
vary according to these assumptions, with unemployment benefits being fixed in real terms. Simi-
lar results go through for the case when unemployment benefits are proportional to after-tax urban
wages. This figure demonstrates that fixing energy taxes in the agricultural sector results in a
higher drop in the income of agricultural workers than when carbon taxes are levied at the same
rate across sectors. Intuitively, when carbon taxes are fixed in the agricultural sector, urban-sector
workers are subject to relatively higher energy taxation and they distribute this higher burden of
taxation to workers in both agricultural and informal sectors through larger migration and larger
informal-sector employment. Larger migration pushes down agricultural-sector wages by more
compared with the situation when energy taxes are levied universally in the economy.
FIGURE 3 Earnings in the Agricultural Sector, by Model [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
FIGURE 4 Agricultural Sector: Earnings and Energy Tax [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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4.4 | Energy subsidies and income of agricultural workers
The pervasiveness of energy subsidies in developing countries, particularly in the agricultural sector,
is well documented. In this section, I consider an economy in which energy use in the agricultural sec-
tor is subsidized. I analyze an energy tax reform comprising increases in urban-area carbon taxes
(manufacturing sector) and a reduction in agricultural-sector energy subsidies. Figure 5 presents the
effects of a carbon tax on unemployment in the model with different values of the subsidies (scaled
relative to the baseline values), under proportional UI: the blue line corresponds to the case with the
subsidy imposed at the baseline value of 0.15. A lower subsidy is associated with a larger decrease
in the unemployment rate (even though the differences are very small). Intuitively, larger subsidies
create more budgetary pressure and less room for the government to reduce payroll taxes. As the gov-
ernment is unable to reduce labor taxes sufficiently to compensate for the large tax burden associated
with higher energy taxes, the reduction in unemployment is less pronounced.
Figure 6 is the counterpart to Figure 5 and displays the impact of the energy tax reform on
earnings (scaled relative to the baseline values) in the agricultural sector under different values of
energy subsidies. As expected, a lower level of energy subsidies in the agricultural sector is associ-
ated with a lower decline in earnings of workers in that sector. As discussed earlier, unemployment
is reduced by less under the presence of larger subsidies, so that higher migration to the rural area
results in a larger decline in wages in that sector.
FIGURE 5 Aggregate Unemployment and Energy Subsidies [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
FIGURE 6 Agricultural-Sector Earnings and Energy Subsidies [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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5 | SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
In this section I examine the robustness of the baseline results from Section 4. I start by varying
the value of the expenditure share of energy in production. Next, I examine how the value of the
parameter /, the elasticity of search costs with respect to search intensity, affects the baseline
results. I also analyze how sensitive results are to the assumption that labor taxes are evaded in the
informal sector by introducing a new parameter f, which captures the degree of labor tax evasion.
Then, I vary the value of parameter b that governs the workers’ bargaining power. Finally, I
explore the sensitivity of the baseline results to the choice of functional form for the production
process, by considering a CES specification instead of a Cobb–Douglas specification for the pro-
duction function.
5.1 | Varying the energy intensity of the formal sector
I first investigate how the results presented in the previous section change if I vary the value of
the expenditure share of energy in production. The baseline expenditure share of energy in the
urban area is xE = 0.231, which, as discussed in Section 3, is consistent with some estimates of
energy intensity in the manufacturing sub-sectors across developing countries, but is much higher
than the values of energy expenditure shares used in recent macroeconomic models of climate
change (0.04). To accommodate these differences in estimates, I consider alternative values of the
expenditure share of energy (1 a1  a2  xE) ranging between 0.04 and 0.1, while keeping the
value of a1 (the expenditure share of capital) at its baseline value of 0.269. Similarly, the baseline
expenditure share of energy in the rural area is /E ¼ 1 c1  c2 ¼ 0:15. Alternative values of
the energy share in the agricultural sector range from 0.05 to 0.1, and these are considered while
keeping the value of c1 (expenditure share of capital) at its baseline value of 0.63.
Figures 7 and 8 display the effects of increasing the carbon tax in the urban sector on aggregate
unemployment and wages in the agricultural sector when unemployment benefits are proportional
to the urban wage and when the level of subsidies in the agricultural sector is fixed at
sa = 0.15,23 under alternative values of xE. These figures show that aggregate unemployment
and wages in the agricultural sector vary by much less when the production process of the urban
sector is more labor-intensive.
Intuitively, with a smaller share of energy in urban production, declines in energy demand due
to higher energy taxes impose a smaller tax burden and the effects of environmental taxation are
FIGURE 7 Aggregate Unemployment by Energy Intensity, Urban Sector [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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less pronounced. Although payroll taxes have a wider tax base, there are also less energy tax rev-
enues to be recycled, and as such, payroll taxes are cut by less. The unemployment rate is reduced
but the effect is rather small compared to the situation when the urban area has a higher energy
share in its production. Therefore, the size of the double dividend is sensitive to the energy inten-
sity of the industry, subject to environmental regulation. If it is highly labor-intensive, the pro-
spects for reduction in unemployment are much lower in the economy. Consequently, even more
unemployed people migrate to the rural area, resulting in a higher decline in earnings in that sec-
tor, as shown in Figure 5.
In order to understand how the parameterization of energy intensity in the agricultural sector
affects these results, Figures 9 and 10display the change in aggregate unemployment and agricul-
tural-sector wages. The figures depict the results in the benchmark model and in the core model
under alternative energy intensities of the agricultural sector, when the energy tax in the agricul-
tural sector is fixed at sa = 0.15. The figures show that the lower the energy intensity of the agri-
cultural sector (and consequently, a relatively higher energy intensity of the manufacturing/urban
sector), the higher is the decline in unemployment, with a lower reduction in agricultural-sector
wages. Payroll taxes and unemployment decrease by more when the energy intensity of agricul-
tural sector is lower. This implies less migration to the rural area and consequently a lower reduc-
tion in real wages in that sector.
FIGURE 8 Agricultural-Sector Earnings by Energy Intensity, Urban Sector [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
FIGURE 9 Aggregate Unemployment by Energy Intensity, Agricultural Sector [Colour figure can be viewed
at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
528 | KURALBAYEVA
5.2 | The elasticity of search costs to search intensity
In the baseline model, the elasticity of the search costs, r(s) = pzs/, with respect to the search
efforts is represented by the parameter / set at 2 as in Satchi and Temple (2009). There are two
channels at work through which the value of the elasticity parameter / affects migration decisions.
An increase in search intensity raises search costs but also increases the probability of finding a
job. If the value of / exceeds unity, then the expected benefits from search, sr
0
(s), exceed the
costs, r(s). This encourages workers to stay in the city rather than migrating back to the rural area,
as the equilibrium migration condition suggests:
wa þ va ¼ zþ bþ r½er  1: (35)
In this way, the income of rural workers is affected. Thus, by varying the value of /, I examine
how the elasticity of search costs influences the energy tax incidence on rural workers. I consider
two alternative values: / = 1.5 and / = 3. I assume that energy taxes in agricultural sector are
fixed at the baseline value of 0.15 and consider the proportional UI scheme. Table 8 in the online
appendix presents the results for different values of / and demonstrates that lower values of / are
associated with larger city sizes and consequently a lower rural population. The changing value of
/ affects (through general equilibrium) all other variables of the model, most importantly the
income of the unemployed z and unemployment benefits b, which jointly with r[ɛr1] impact the
amount of migration to the rural area. Under the given parameterization, with larger returns to
migration (the right-hand side of the above equation), people tend to migrate to the city, increasing
the income of agricultural workers.
5.3 | Degree of labor tax evasion
I introduce a new parameter, 0≤f≤1, into the proportional UI indexation scheme such that
b = pbwm and z = pz(1+sLf)wm. It is clear that if f = 1, then the indexation scheme nests the base-
line indexation scheme (proportional UI); if f = 0, then the indexation scheme implies that labor
taxes are not evaded in the informal sector and the income of the unemployed moves in line with
that of the employed. The parameter f thus captures the degree of labor tax evasion in the informal
sector. I examine the effects on the baseline results by considering two alternative values: f = 0
FIGURE 10 Earnings in the Agricultural Sector by Energy Intensity, Agricultural Sector [Colour figure can
be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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and f = 0.5. Table 9 in the online appendix presents the effects of varying f on key variables of
the model. The key result is that the results under f = 0 are quantitatively different from those
with f = 1 and f = 0.5, which both exhibit similar qualitative patterns. In particular, unemploy-
ment increases under the former and decreases under the latter scenarios.
These results provide insights in addition to the baseline results on the potential of double divi-
dends in employment, which happen, as discussed in Section 4.1, when the unemployed share the
brunt of higher energy taxation. The results in Table 9 in the online appendix further illustrate this
point. When f = 0, both the employed and the unemployed share the costs of a cleaner environ-
ment equally. Both formal-sector wages and the total income of the unemployed fall by the same
amount (2.1 percent) when carbon taxes are increased from 15 percent to 30 percent. In contrast,
when f = 0.5 and f = 1, the tax burden is heavier on the unemployed, with their income falling
by 3.3 percent and 4.4 percent compared with a reduction in formal-sector wages by 1.7 percent
and 1.3 percent, respectively.
5.4 | Workers0 bargaining power
As discussed above, the scope for a double dividend depends on how environmental taxation affects
the income of the unemployed, z and b. If environmental regulation influences the outside option of
workers so that the unemployed share the higher burden of energy taxation, as under proportional UI
considered earlier, then a double dividend can arise. If, however, environmental policy does not affect
the income of the unemployed, as under fixed UI, then the double dividend does not occur (as previ-
ously shown). However, under Nash bargaining, the equilibrium wages are also influenced by the bar-
gaining power of workers. So, in this section, I explore the effects on the baseline results of varying
the workers’ bargaining power, b, by considering two alternative values: b = 0.25 and b = 0.05. The
baseline value of b is set at 0.5. I assume proportional UI in the core model, with sa = 0.15. Table 10
in the online appendix presents the simulation results of effects of environmental regulation on unem-
ployment under these different assumptions on b. The table suggests a nonlinear relationship between
unemployment rate and workers’ bargaining power. On one hand, with higher bargaining power,
workers resist larger cuts in after-tax wages, increasing labor costs and reducing employment in the
formal sector. So, higher bargaining power must be associated with a higher unemployment rate. This
is the case of b = 0.5 compared to the case when b = 0.25. On the other hand, if the workers’ bar-
gaining power is too low so that firms dominate the bargaining process (i.e. b?0), then from equa-
tion (23) it follows that W?U, that is, the formal-sector wages become equal to the workers’
reservation wage. In that case, it is not possible to shift the higher burden of energy taxation on infor-
mal-sector workers and thus the unemployment rate falls by less. This is what I observe by comparing
the baseline case b = 0.5 with the case when b = 0.05.
5.5 | A nested CES production function
As discussed in Section 3, a Cobb–Douglas specification for the production process is a reasonable
representation of energy input with a longer time horizon, while a CES specification is a better
representation of energy demand in the short and medium term. Even though the baseline model
assumed the case of an open capital account and thus implies the case of a longer-term horizon,
some developing countries are more integrated with financial capital markets and thus it would be
important to investigate how the baseline results change within the context of those countries. As
such, I repeat the simulations of the benchmark model under the previous two assumptions about
the unemployment benefits and income of the unemployed, and with the formal-sector production
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function assumed to be a nested CES production function. I report the results for the case with
proportional UI24 in Table 5.
In all model simulations, the effects on all variables are less pronounced, since with a
lower elasticity of substitution between labor and energy, imposing a carbon tax has a smaller
impact on the relative cost of labor, and thus on labor demand and overall labor market out-
comes.
The low elasticity of substitution between labor and energy results in a small reduction in
payroll taxes, which slightly compensates for the higher tax burden associated with higher
energy taxes, leading to a small reduction in unemployment. For comparison, under the bench-
mark model with a Cobb–Douglas production function, an increase in energy taxes from the
baseline by 5 percent lowers the payroll taxes by 1.7 percent, whilst under the same model
with a CES production function in the urban area, payroll taxes are reduced by a mere 0.52
percent.
The results indicate that reducing emissions is a harder task under a lower elasticity of substitu-
tion, since there is a smaller decline in demand for energy. The results indicate and confirm find-
ings of other studies that point out the importance of the elasticity of substitution between energy
and labor (capital) for the effectiveness of emission reduction initiatives.25
6 | EXTENSIONS
In this section I consider three extensions of the core model. First, the model allows for payroll
taxes paid by employees. Second, the model is extended to explicitly differentiate between unem-
ployed and self-employed, and allows for three states of the labor market in urban sector:
employed, self-employed in the informal sector, and unemployed. Finally, the model allows an
endogenous job destruction rate.
6.1 | Payroll taxes paid by employees
This is an extension of the model in which I incorporate taxes paid by workers in the formal sec-
tor, denoted s. Payroll taxes are important in the Mexican economy26 as they made up 37.2
TABLE 5 Benchmark Model with CES Production Function, Proportional UI
Taxes
se,m sL h u wm/wa wm z b s v
0.15 0.2500 3.5449 0.2982 1.7838 2.3865 1.0771 0.0856 0.5000 0.5285
0.1575 0.2487 3.5446 0.2980 1.7847 2.3854 1.0755 0.0856 0.5005 0.5287
0.165 0.2473 3.5443 0.2978 1.7855 2.3847 1.0740 0.0856 0.5010 0.5288
0.2 0.2411 3.5428 0.2969 1.7898 2.3800 1.0665 0.0854 0.5033 0.5294
0.25 0.2321 3.5405 0.2956 1.7955 2.3741 1.0562 0.0852 0.5066 0.5302
0.3 0.2231 3.5381 0.2943 1.8012 2.3686 1.0461 0.0850 0.5100 0.5310
0.35 0.2141 3.5356 0.2930 1.8068 2.3634 1.0361 0.0848 0.5134 0.5318
0.4 0.2051 3.5329 0.2916 1.8123 2.3584 1.0262 0.0846 0.5169 0.5326
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percent of total government revenue (65.8 percent of government tax revenue) in 2012. In compar-
ison, all IEPS taxes (including energy taxes) make up 3.2 percent of total revenue.27
The key changes to the baseline model are reflected in the Bellman equation for employed
workers (36), the wage determination equation (39), and the government budget constraint (40):
rW ¼ wmð1 sÞ þ kðU W þ PÞ: (36)
In each period the wage is determined by
wm ¼ arg maxðW  UÞbðJ  VÞ1b; (37)
which yields the first-order condition
ð1 bÞð1þ sLÞðW  UÞ ¼ bð1 sÞJ; (38)
and the wage determination equation becomes
wm  ðzþ b rÞ
wm
þ kP
wm
¼ b
1 b mð1 sÞ
r þ k
q
þ sh
 
; (39)
GþuLmb¼ sLwmð1uÞLm 1þmrþkq
 
þ se;mpEemð1uÞLmþ sapEeaLaþLmð1uÞwms: (40)
Table 11 in the online appendix summarizes the results of varying energy taxes in the baseline
core model and its extension, with payroll taxes paid by employees under the fixed UI scheme
(similar results hold for proportional UI). The left panel of the table represents the results of the
extension, and the right panel shows those of the baseline model. The following quantitative differ-
ences in the results are worth highlighting. The unemployment rate is higher and formal-sector
wages are lower in the model where workers pay payroll taxes. Cities tend to be smaller and con-
sequently wages in the agricultural sector are lower in the extended model.
Intuitively, equation (38) suggests that both labor taxes paid by firms and payroll taxes paid by
employees work in the same direction, as they both tend to reduce the value of being employed relative
to being unemployed (WU). An extra distortion in the form of payroll taxes paid by employees trig-
gers a larger decline in employment, smaller cities, and larger declines in the incomes of all workers.
6.2 | Unemployed versus informal workers
I consider the version of the model in which there are three states of the labor market in the city:
employed in the formal sector, unemployed, and employed in the informal sector.28 Once agricul-
tural workers migrate from rural areas, they decide whether to search for jobs in the formal sector
(and be unemployed) or take employment in the informal sector. The returns from being unem-
ployed or employed in the informal sector must be equalized in the steady state. There are two
other key features that distinguish the current version of the model from the baseline, which is
worth emphasizing. First, the income of the unemployed in the baseline model is defined as b+z,
while in the modified version b is the income of unemployed and z is the income that workers
earn working in the informal sector. Second, as the size of the informal sector (and consequently
income z) must be determined endogenously within the model, I follow the literature and assume
that informal-sector production exhibits decreasing marginal returns. The above considerations sug-
gest that there is no one-to-one mapping from the proportional and fixed UI policies studied within
the benchmark model to similar policies within the current setup. Instead, I examine the effects of
the following four scenarios. I consider two indexation schemes (b ¼ b and b = pbwm), which I
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run against two assumptions about informal-sector taxation: in the first, energy taxes are evaded in
the informal sector, with the government budget constraint given by
Gþ uLmb ¼ sLwmð1 uÞLm 1þ m r þ kq
 
þ sEpEemð1 uÞLm þ sapEeaLa; (41)
and in the second, informal-sector workers pay taxes on energy, with the government budget con-
straint given by
Gþ uLmb ¼ sLwmð1 uÞLm 1þ m r þ kq
 
þ sEpEemð1 uÞLm þ sapEeaLa þ sEpEESm: (42)
Table 12 in the online appendix reports the simulation results of two indexation schemes when
energy taxes are not evaded in the informal sector. The results for the other two experiments
convey similar messages and are available upon request. For a given parameterization, the results
of this extension are opposite to what I obtain in the benchmark model and imply that the dou-
ble dividend arises under the first indexation scheme b ¼ b, while the unemployment rate
increases under the other indexation scheme b = pbwm (columns (4) across tables). These results
hold regardless of whether or not energy taxes are evaded in the informal sector and can be
explained as follows. First, comparing columns (4), (8) and (10) across tables, note that the total
unemployment benefits paid by the government, uLmb, decline in response to the tax policy
under both indexation schemes, but by more when unemployment benefits are fixed. This creates
extra room in the budget for a reduction in payroll taxes (which fall by more, as columns (2)
across tables show) under the first indexation scheme, b ¼ b, than in the second one, b = pbwm,
resulting in a reduction in the unemployment rate under the former and an increase under the lat-
ter.
Why are the results are different than under benchmark model? In the baseline model, the
income of informal workers comprises unemployment benefits b and income from informal activi-
ties z, with z representing the bulk of the income of informal workers (93 percent). So, in the base-
line model, a double dividend arises as the tax burden shifts onto the unemployed through the
effect of tax policy, primarily on the income generated in the informal sector z, by introducing
energy taxes that have a heavier burden on the income of informal workers than labor taxes (which
are evaded in informal sector). In contrast, in this extension, unemployed and informal workers are
separate groups, and since the returns on both activities are equalized in equilibrium, it does not
matter whether energy taxes are evaded or not in the informal sector, but rather it matters how
energy tax reform affects payments to unemployed.
6.3 | Endogenous job destruction
In this section I endogenize the job destruction rate k by introducing productivity shocks in the
model. I assume that each job is endowed with a random idiosyncratic productivity parameter f
drawn from a stationary and known distribution function G(f), which has finite support
½fmin; fmax. I assume a uniform distribution on the support [0,1], so that G(f) = f. The stochastic
process governing productivity shocks is Poisson with arrival rate d. It is assumed that a new
job is created with the highest productivity fmax. A job is destroyed only if the idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity parameter falls below some critical value f. As a result, jobs are destroyed at the rate
dGðfÞ.
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6.3.1 | Labor market equilibrium
The steady-state Bellman equations for unemployed and employed workers are given by
rU ¼ zþ b rþ sqhðWðfmaxÞ  UÞ; (43)
rWðfÞ ¼ wmðfÞ þ d
Z fmax
f
ðWðxÞ WðfÞÞdGðxÞ þ dGðfÞðU WðfÞÞ;
¼ wmðfÞ þ d
Z fmax
f
WðxÞdGðxÞ  dWðfÞ þ dGðfÞU:
(44)
These equations can be interpreted as follows. Equation (43) says that an unemployed worker,
who gets an instantaneous utility z+br today, can find a job at a rate sqh, in which he will start
at the highest productivity level fmax and thus obtain an expected utility of WðfmaxÞ. Equation (44)
says that an employed worker, who works at a certain productivity level f and obtains an instanta-
neous utility wm(f), can be hit by a productivity shock at a rate d and will then continue working
in that job only if the productivity of the match is at least equal to f. If, however, the productivity
of the match is below the threshold level f, which happens with probability dGðfÞ, the worker
becomes unemployed and loses W(f)U.
For firms, the values of a filled job and a vacancy are given by the following equations, respec-
tively:
rV ¼ cþ qðJðfmaxÞ  VÞ; (45)
rJðfÞ ¼ yðkm; emÞðfÞ  ð1þ sLÞwmðfÞ þ d
Z fmax
f
ðJðxÞ  JðfÞÞdGðxÞ þ dGðfÞðV  JðfÞÞ
¼ yðkm; emÞðfÞ  ð1þ sLÞwmðfÞ þ d
Z fmax
f
JðxÞdGðxÞ  dJðfÞ:
(46)
6.3.2 | Labor demand condition
The free entry condition implies that V = 0 and the value of a new job is given by
JðfmaxÞ ¼
c
q
: (47)
6.3.3 | Wage determination
In each period, the wage is determined by
wm ¼ arg maxðWðfÞ  UÞbðJðfÞ  VÞ1b; (48)
which yields the first-order condition
ð1 bÞð1þ sLÞðWðfÞ  UÞ ¼ bJðfÞ: (49)
It can be shown that the wage determination equation is given by
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wmðfÞ ¼ b yðkm; emÞðfÞ1þ sL þ ð1 bÞðzþ b rÞ þ
shbc
1þ sL : (50)
6.3.4 | Unemployment rate
The number of workers who enter unemployment is dGðfÞLmð1 uÞ, and the number of
unemployed who become employed is Lmsuhq(h). In the steady state, these two flows are
equal:
u ¼ dGðf
Þ
dGðfÞ þ shq : (51)
6.3.5 | Job creation and job destruction
It can be shown that the job creation condition can be written as
c
q
¼ 1 b
r þ d ½yðkm; emÞðfÞ  yðkm; emÞðf
Þ; (52)
while the job destruction condition can be written as
ð1 bÞð1þ sLÞðzþ b rÞ þ shbcþ d 1 br þ d y
0
fðkm; emÞ
Z fmax
f
GðxÞdx ¼ ð1 bÞyðkm; emÞðfÞ þ d cq :
(53)
6.3.6 | Results
In this model simulation, I take 100 draws from the distribution G(f) and take averages of all vari-
ables. Table 13 in the online appendix reports the results for the case where b = pbwm and
z = pz(1+sL)wm. The left panel of the table reports the results of the model with endogenous job
destruction, while the right panel presents the results of the model with exogenous job destruction.
The table suggests that for a given increase in carbon taxes, the model with an exogenous separa-
tion rate
The table suggests that in the model with an endogenous separation rate, the decline in the
unemployment rate under a UI compensation scheme (also observed in the model with exogenous
separation rate) happens only when both the level of carbon taxes and the level of unemployment
reaches some higher level than the baseline values. This can be explained as follows. The model
with exogenous job destruction assumes constant productivity of 1 for urban-sector firms. In con-
trast, in the model with endogenous job destruction, the productivity of firms varies depending on
a random draw from the uniform distribution over support (0,1), so that average productivity is
less than unity. In response to this low productivity, for a given level of carbon taxes, the optimal
strategy for firms is to hire fewer workers and impose a higher level of labor taxes. It is only opti-
mal to increase the number of employees when the number of employed workers becomes low
enough, and this is achieved through a reduction in labor taxes as in the model with an exogenous
separation rate.
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7 | CONCLUSION
This paper uses a simple dual economy, general equilibrium model with job search frictions to ana-
lyze the effects of environmental taxation on aggregate unemployment and wages. It confirms the
findings of existing studies on developed countries that green tax reforms can reduce unemployment
when the tax burden is shifted on to workers in other sectors (informal and rural). The key difference
from existing studies that focus on developed countries is that the incidence of carbon taxes is partly
shifted on to rural workers through the rural–urban migration channel. Thus, even in situations where
rural workers do not directly pay taxes, they bear part of the costs of environmental regulation
through reduced wages. These results highlight the fact that the labor market consequences of carbon
tax reforms can spread beyond the sector that is subject to the taxation and thus can be counter-intui-
tive. The analysis of this paper therefore suggests that modeling developing countries while ignoring
their distinctive features can result in qualitatively different conclusions on the effects of environmen-
tal regulation from conventional studies on developed countries.
The general equilibrium framework developed in this paper incorporates two key features of
developing countries: a large informal sector, and rural–urban migration. By illustrating the impor-
tance of rural–urban migration through which adjustment to environmental taxation occurs, the
model underlines issues that can potentially be very important in evaluating the welfare implica-
tions of green tax reforms in developing countries. In particular, probable issues associated with
rural–urban migration in developing countries are many and range from limited access to credit,
infrastructure, and services, and unfair property rights of rural migrants in urban areas. Under such
circumstances, migration of urban workers back to the rural area in response to high energy taxes
in the urban area, although associated with a decline in real rural wages, can be beneficial from an
overall welfare point of view. The model also highlights the importance of modeling the relative
energy intensity of the rural vis-a-vis the urban sector in studying both direct and spillover
(through migration) effects of environmental regulation. Welfare implications of environmental tax-
ation could be analyzed by incorporating the framework of this paper within a broader macroeco-
nomic model of developing countries.
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ENDNOTES
1 Albrecht et al. (2009), Zenou (2008), Bosch and Esteban-Pretel (2012), and Ulyssea (2010), for instance, have
modeled the informal sector to study the implications of various labor market institutions and different tax policies,
such as severance payments, or enforcement of regulations on labor market outcomes in developing countries.
They have not looked at the interactions of labor markets and environmental regulations as I do in this paper.
2 The description of the core setting of the model draws heavily on Kuralbayeva (2017) who uses a simplified ver-
sion of this model to study interaction between environmental taxation, employment, and public spending in devel-
oping countries.
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3 The model thus assumes random search in the urban sector. To examine sector-specific search, the model should
consider more disaggregated sectors (e.g. manufacturing and services), which is beyond the current scope of the
paper.
4 This simple specification implies that I do not explicitly model how factors of production (energy, capital, labor)
are utilized in the production process in the informal sector, and thus allows me to disregard the effects of tax pol-
icy that operate through the relative energy intensities of the formal sector and the informal sector. Bento et al.
(2012) examine how an untaxed informal sector can sharply reduce the cost of energy tax reforms through an
expansion of the tax base. For their analysis, the sign of the effect is critically dependent on the relative energy
intensities of the manufacturing, informal, and formal services sectors.
5 See Goulder (2013) for a recent survey of the existing literature on the conditions for a double dividend.
6 The model assumes that energy is imported at given world prices. Future research should account for the fact that
retail prices of energy products are often controlled by the government.
7 The tax gap is the difference between the theoretical tax revenue (based on estimates of the tax base) and the
actual amount of taxes received.
8 Some forms of unemployment insurance (UI) currently exist in a handful of developing countries (see Vodopivec,
2013; Velasquez, 2010; Gerard and Gonzaga, 2012), most of them Latin American countries.
9 See http://www.socialsecurityextension.org/gimi/gess/ShowTheme.do?tid=2667.
10 Migration from rural to urban areas makes it more difficult for workers in the informal sector to find jobs in the
formal sector, undermining the relative attractiveness of being in the informal urban sector.
11 This section draws heavily on a corresponding one in Kuralbayeva (2017).
12 For example, see Pissarides (1998), Satchi and Temple (2009), and Zenou (2008).
13 See, for example, Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), Zenou (2008), Albrecht et al. (2009), and Pissarides (1998).
14 This share also comprises those who have a formal job. Formal employment in the informal sector, however, rep-
resents only a very small fraction of non-agricultural employment. To illustrate this point, I also compute the
informal employment in informal sector as share of non-agricultural employment, by using the data (ILO, 2012)
on the number of people in informal employment and the number of people in informal employment outside the
informal sector. The estimate is 33.5 percent.
15 Note that, given this parameterization, the agricultural sector is a proxy for rural area production and thus, in this
paper, the terms ‘agricultural sector’ and ‘rural area’ will be used interchangeably.
16 See http://www.oecd.org/ctp/tax-policy/taxingwages-mexico.htm; average compulsory payment wedge measures
the taxes and non-tax compulsory payments.
17 General government final consumption expenditure (as a percentage of GDP, NE.CON.GOVT.ZS) from World
Development Indicators, World Bank, includes all government current expenditures for purchases of goods and
services (including compensation of employees). It also includes most expenditures on national defense and secu-
rity, but excludes government military expenditures that are part of government capital formation.
18 The assumption of an open capital account also ensures that the Hosios condition for efficiency is satisfied in the
model. Given similarity between the setup of this paper and the one in Satchi and Temple (2009), for similar rea-
sons, when the Hosios condition is not satisfied and the capital account is closed, the level of search intensity can
be inefficiently high and the city size is too large.
19 The value of the elasticity ɛ = 0.05 (or below), as shown by Hassler et al. (2012), implies the sensible energy-sav-
ing and capital-labor saving technology series if interpreted as technologies. Their estimates also suggest that the
technology trends are positive and of very similar magnitude, so that I set A = AE.
20 Empirical estimates of the share of energy in production c2 vary by industry. For example, Dissou et al. (2012)
find that the value of c2 varies between 0.024 (transportation equipment) and 0.186 (primary metals). Hence, I set
the value of c2 in the range of these estimates, close to estimates of the energy share in non-metal mineral prod-
ucts or in chemicals.
21 Table 7 in the online appendix, which accompanies Figures 1 and 2, shows the effect of a given change in energy
taxes on a number of variables in the model.
22 Some earlier studies, such as Shah and Whalley (1991), have pointed to the fact that tax incidence results are dif-
ferent in developing countries compared with that in developed ones, given the particular features of the former.
23 Similar results follow in the case of energy taxes levied on the agricultural sector.
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24 Other results are available upon request.
25 For example, Jorgenson et al. (2000), using a computable general equilibrium model for the US economy, exam-
ine the role of flexibility in production (the ability of firms to substitute between labor, capital, or other materials
for energy) when imposing carbon emission reductions. They find that rigidity in production more than doubles
the costs of mitigation policies. The effectiveness of mitigation policies can also be sensitive to varying values of
elasticity of substitution between energy and labor (capital). Burniaux and Martins (2012) show that high inter-fac-
tor (between energy and value-added) and inter-fuel substitution elasticities can generate large carbon leakages.
26 Payroll taxes are paid by employees (individual income tax, also referred to as ISR in Mexico).
27 Data are taken from the report Confederacion Patronal de la Republica Mexicana, Vision Coparmex, Reforma fis-
cal a revision, Coparmex, Mexico, 2013.
28 I follow Charlot et al. (2013) in defining the distinction between unemployed and informal sector workers. See
the online technical appendix for an outline of this version of the model.
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